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Introduction
Central banks control their monetary policy instruments in efforts to reach their policy goals. While the primary goal of most central banks is price stability, many central banks also care about real activity (output, unemployment) . 1 Moreover, contributing or even guaranteeing domestic financial stability often belongs to the catalogue of objectives of numerous modern central banks, such as the Federal Reserve Bank (Bernanke [2002] ).
While the objectives of central banks are not too controversial, there is much less agreement on the question whether central banks should try to employ their monetary policy instruments to contribute to financial stability, especially in as far as asset markets (i.e. stock and real estate markets) are concerned.
The traditional view 2 is in strong opposition to monetary policy rules reacting on asset market developments. Building up on a dynamic New Keynesian framework Bernanke and Gertler [1999, 2001] argue that central banks should view price and financial stability as complementary and almost consistent goals. 3 Their advice is that monetary policy should focus on price stability and respond to changes in asset prices only when they signal changes in expected inflation. Bernanke [2002] renewed this view in his speech before the New York Chapter of the National Association for Business Economics arguing on the basis of a division of labour argument (''Use the right tool for the job''). While monetary policy should be used to reach macroeconomic goals, regulatory, supervisory and lending of last resort power should be employed to guarantee financial stability (see also Schwartz [2002] for a similar line of argument). Christiano et al. [2008] basically argue that bubbles arise from misperceived technology shocks and thus asset prices should not be targeted by monetary policy. Kohn [2009] argues that monetary policy has little ability to influence the speculative component of asset prices and ''leaning against the wind'' will likely result in suboptimal economic performance in the medium term.
However, various economists take a different point of view and advocate reacting to movements in asset prices stronger than these changes imply to stabilize aggregate de-3 mand and inflation. While Borio and Lowe [2002] , Wheelock [2002,2003] , Detken and Smets [2004] and Ahearne et al. [2005] deduce this conclusion from empirical observations of asset market bubbles in the past, there is also a considerable number of theoretical papers coming to similar results. Smets [1997] shows that in a comparatively simple macroeconomic framework, asset prices turn out to be part of an optimal monetary policy reaction function whenever aggregate demand depends positively on real asset prices. Cecchetti et al. [2000] and Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani [2002] argue that reacting to asset price movements might be advantageous due to the fact that asset prices have implications for price stability at a different horizon from that of a typical inflation forecast. Bordo and Jeanne [2002] study monetary policy in a New Keynesian framework with collateral constraints in the productive sector and find the optimal monetary policy rule to depend not only on the output gap and inflation but also on the prospective developments in the asset markets. Dupor [2005] analyzes in how far central banks should react to irrational expectation shocks to future returns to capital in a sticky price model with investment adjustment costs. Since these shocks generate inefficient investments there is a trade-off between stabilizing nominal prices and nonfundamental asset price movements. Given the central bank has at least some information on the nature of occurring shocks, the monetary policy should always react on these shocks. Using a dynamic portfolio approach Platen and Semmler [2009] show that the optimal monetary policy rule should react, among other variables, to the amount of wealth invested into risky assets.
The most important prerequisite 4 for monetary policy to be successful in the task of guaranteeing financial stability is that it has a systematic and predictable effect on asset prices.
Various studies have tackled this issue empirically. 5 Although the results vary to some degree between sample countries and periods, one might conclude from the literature that stock markets remain broadly unaffected by monetary policy measures while real estate markets tend to react to central banks' instruments. However, in as far as real estate mar-4 kets are concerned, the empirical evidence is somewhat limited since the empirical studies almost exclusively focus on house prices and thus cover only a sub-segment of the real estate market. In this paper we aim at filling this gap in the empirical literature and conduct a disaggregated analysis of the effects of monetary policy on various sub-segments of the real estate market (as well as the real estate market as a whole). Employing a new dataset for Switzerland we estimate vector autoregressive models (VAR) to study the impulse responses of house and apartment prices, the private rental market and various subsegments of the market for commercial real estate to interest rate shocks.
The paper is structured as follows: The second section briefly reviews the already existing empirical literature on the effects of monetary policy on stock and real estate markets.
After outlining our empirical approach in section 3 we turn to a description of the employed dataset in section 4. Section 5 reports and discusses the empirical results. As usual, the paper closes with a summary of the main findings and some conclusions.
Brief Review of the Empirical Literature
The empirical literature on the influence of monetary policy on asset prices has grown significantly over the last decade. From a methodological point of view, the empirical literature is dominated by vector-autoregressive models studying the interaction of indicators of the current stance of monetary policy, various macroeconomic variables (e.g. inflation, output or unemployment) and asset prices. The predominance of the VAR approach might be attributed to the fact that VARs are capable of dealing with possible endogeneity problems in an adequate way (Dreger and Wolters [2009a] ).
The empirical literature tackles the question in how far monetary policy has an influence on asset prices in two different ways. A first strand of the literature studies in how far aggregate liquidity affects asset prices (see e.g. Baks and Kramer [1999] , Rüffer and Stracca [2006] , Greiber and Setzer [2007] , Roffia and Zaghini [2007] , Adalid and Detken [2007] , Giese and Tuxen [2007] , Setzer [2008,2010] , Goodhart and Hofmann [2008] or Dreger and Wolters [2009b] ). However, while aggregate liquidity is influenced by monetary policy decisions, it is obviously not under complete control of the central bank. The second strand of the literature studies the link between central banks' interest rate decisions and asset prices and thus focuses more directly on the influence monetary authorities exert on asset markets. Since we aim at studying in how far central banks are capable of influencing asset prices, we focus the following brief review of the empirical literature on the second strand of the literature. Rüffer and Stracca [2006] construct an aggregate asset market index, consisting of residential and commercial property prices and stocks. When studying the effects of interest rate shocks on the aggregate asset index in a global VAR covering the U.S., Japan and Europe they find a significantly negative effect on the asset market.
There are also some studies focusing exclusively on the real estate sector or, more precisely, house prices. Giuliodori [2005] runs individual VARs for 9 OECD countries and finds interest rate shocks to have significant effects on house prices. Demary [2009] comes to the same result for 10 slightly differing sample countries. Jarocinsky and Smets [2008] and Goodhart and Hofmann [2008] confirm this finding in their studies. While Jarocinsky and Smets [2008] apply the Bayesian VAR technique to U.S data, Goodhart and Hofmann [2008] conduct a panel VAR analysis for 17 countries. Greiber and Setzer [2007] present supporting evidence of the hypothesis that monetary policy influences house prices or at least property wealth.
Similar as Rüffer and Stracca [2006] , Belke, Orth and Setzer [2008] construct a global dataset (consisting of the Euro Area and 9 countries). However, instead of using an aggregate asset market index they study house prices and stocks separately. While they find interest rate shocks to have no effect on the development of the stock market, house prices react (inversely) to these shocks. Dreger and Wolters [2009a] arrive at the same result when running individual VARs for the U.S., the Euro-area, Japan and the United Kingdom. As-
senmacher-Wesche and Gerlach [2009] conduct both, individual VARs and a panel VAR.
Their results confirm the influence of interest rate shocks on house prices. However, Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach [2009] also find a significant influence of interest rate shocks on stock markets. Because the timing of the different asset classes is quite different, the authors nevertheless refrain from proposing to use monetary policy to influence asset prices.
Summing up, one might conclude that the existing empirical evidence points into the direction that interest rate shocks have little effect on stock markets while increasing interest rates seem to depress house prices and vice versa. While the empirical results are not too controversial, the results for the real estate market are somewhat incomplete. Almost all studies focus on housing prices and thus only a sub-segment of the real estate sector.
Often, owner-occupied apartments are not included in the analysis. The same holds true for the rental market. Moreover, the market for commercial real estate is almost completely neglected in the empirical literature. To the best of our knowledge, the only study focusing on commercial property was conducted by Gruber and Lee [2008] . However, this study is concerned with the effect of bank lending on commercial property prices and thus stands only in somewhat loose connection with the described monetary policy literature.
Data
In order to learn about the effects of monetary policy on the various sub-segments of the real estate market we employ data from Switzerland. Our data sample consists of quarterly data ranging from 1987:Q4 to 2008:Q4.
First we employ macroeconomic data on inflation (p) and the gross domestic product (gdp). The data were taken from the OECD Main Economic Indicators database.
Second, we need data on the central monetary policy instrument. Since the three-month target libor rate (i) is the primary monetary policy instrument of the Swiss National Bank Finally, we are in need of appropriate data on asset prices. As far as the stock market is concerned, we use the Swiss Performance Index 
Estimation Approach
To analyze the linkage between interest rate decisions of SNB and asset prices, we use a vector-autoregressive model (VAR), originally introduced by Sims [1980] . As outlined in section 2, this econometric framework is typically employed for the empirical analysis of the effects of monetary policy instruments on macroeconomic variables. In VAR estimations every endogenous variable is regressed on its own lags and the lags of all other variables in the model. More precisely we estimate the following unrestricted VAR in reduced form:
where x is the vector of the n endogenous variables at time t, A are the n n matrices of parameters which can be estimated using the reduced form and c is a n 1 vector of constants. u denotes a n 1 vector of unobservable error terms where Eu 0,
Eu u ` V.
The VAR residuals cannot be interpreted as simple shocks because they are generally correlated. In order to identify monetary policy shocks (i.e. interest rate shocks) correctly, the shocks have to be independent across equations so that we can trace their isolated effect on the endogenous variables. To get observable and orthogonal shocks we reformulate the VAR in structural form, i.e.
A · x c A · x B · ε
Here, ε denotes the n 1 vector of disturbances which are now uncorrelated and can be interpreted as structural shocks where Eε 0,
Eε ε ` D,
The relationship between the VAR residuals and these structural shocks can be written as
To obtain the structural shocks we have to impose restrictions on matrix B. In line with most of the literature we use Cholesky-decomposition to identify the system. In line with the monetary transmission literature (see Christiano et al. [1999] ) we order the variables as follows: x p, gdp, i, m, e, s , where e denotes the particular real estate price index.
Real estate prices and stock prices may react immediately on the policy instrument, inflation and gross domestic product react only with a lag to interest rate shocks. 7 As the central bank's policy instrument is the main refinancing rate we order money supply directly behind the interest rate (see Favero [2001] ).
We specify all estimated VARs in levels. 
Empirical Results
Altogether, we estimate seven different VAR models. 9 While inflation (p), the gross domestic product (gdp), the three-month target libor rate (i), the money stock (m) and the Swiss Performance Index (s) enter all regressions as endogenous variables, we use different measures for the real estate market. In a benchmark specification we start out with an aggregate measure of the real estate market, the earlier described Real Estate Performance Index (realestate). We then repeat the estimations with the available indices of the six sub-segments of the Swiss real estate market. The lag structure of the VARs was determined on the basis of the Schwarz information criterion, whereas we considered a maximum lag length of six. The optimal lag length turned out to be 1 for the VARs including office, flat, house, industry and realestate. For rental the optimal lag length was 2, for sale it was 6.
In the benchmark specification we use the Swiss Performance Index as stock market indicator and the Real Estate Performance Index as indicator for the aggregate real estate market including all sub-segments. In line with most of the previous empirical literature we find that monetary policy remains without any effect on the stock market. As the impulse response function shown in figure 1 clearly depicts, there is no significant effect of interest rate shocks on the stock market performance indicator. 10 9 Instead of presenting and discussing all impulse response functions of the 7 VARs, we concentrate on the effects of monetary policy on the asset market indicators, here. A complete documentation of the results can be found in the appendix. 10 The reaction of the stock market indicator to interest rate shocks turns out to be insignificant in all VAR specifications. We therefore refrain from reporting the results here in length. The complete set of impulse responses is provided in the appendix. Switching to the disaggregated perspective shows that the different sub-segments of the real estate market react quite different to monetary policy.
The private sub-segment of the real estate market broadly consists of houses and apartments. We have two indicators available measuring the actual purchase prices of houses (house) and apartments (flats). We also have an indicator measuring the actual rents to be paid for apartments (rental).
In figure 3 and 4 we show the impulse responses of house and flat prices to interest rate shocks. Not too surprisingly, both sub-segments react quite similar. An increase in the
Swiss key interest rate leads to both a significant decrease in house and flat prices. While flat prices react after one quarter, the effect on house prices becomes significant after half a year. After two and a half years, the effects reach their maximum strengths. The effects disappear after roughly 4 years. The likely interpretation of these results is that higher interest rates lead to an increase of credits costs making acquisitions of one's own property less attractive. Thus assuming fixed supply, the decreasing demand depresses purchase prices of both houses and flats. Altogether, these results broadly coincide with former empirical studies (see e.g. Guilidori [2004] , Demary [2009] or Jarocinsky and Smets [2008] ) which, however, exclusively concentrate on the house market. In order to get a richer picture of the effects of monetary policy on the private real estate market we also study the effects of interest rate shocks on rental prices of apartments. In figure 5 we show the impulse response function of apartment rental prices to interest rate shocks. Obviously, there is an adverse effect of monetary policy on rental prices. An increase in the Swiss libor rate is quickly followed by increasing rental prices. This effect lasts about 5 quarters before it diminishes. indicate that -at least in Switzerland -this sort of substitution effect seems to be empirically relevant.
While privately used property prices react significantly to monetary policy, commercial property prices do not. Figure 6 and 7 show the impulse responses of industrial real estate prices and office space prices to interest rate shocks, figure 8 the one of sales area prices to interest rate shocks. None of the reactions turns out to be significantly different from zero. 11 Figure 6 : Response of Industrial Real Estate to Interest Rate Shock 11 Impulse responses of prices for sales area to interest rate shocks lead to exploding confidence bands when estimating the VAR including 6 lags. We also studied impulse responses using only one respectively two lags. The results did not change. To check for robustness of our results we checked in how far the impulse responses are sensitive to the ordering of the variables. In a first step we changed the order of monetary policy instruments, i.e. ordering the monetary aggregates before the interest rate. Second, we exchanged inflation and gdp. Third, we changed the asset market variables, i.e. the real estate price index e and the Swiss Performance Index s. These variations did not change the results indicating that they do not primarily depend on the specific ordering of the variables.
Summary and Conclusions
A necessary precondition to employ monetary policy to stabilize asset markets is that monetary policy has a significant and predictable effect on asset prices. Most empirical studies find stock markets to remain unaffected by interest rate shocks. With respect to real estate markets, the empirical evidence is somewhat limited in as far as the literature almost exclusively focused on house prices and thus a sub-segment of the private real estate market. However, most empirical studies found house prices -different from stocksto react significantly to monetary policy instruments.
Employing a new dataset for Switzerland we find empirical evidence which is broadly in line with the literature in as far as the aggregate level is concerned. As the majority of earlier analysis did, we find no influence of variations of the central monetary policy instrument of SNB on stock markets while the Swiss Real Estate Performance Index as a measure of the whole real estate market reacts significantly to monetary policy. However, the Results of Unit Root Tests (ADF-Test; for every time series a constant is included, for some time series a deterministic linear time trend is regarded.) Table A1 : Unit Root Test of p. Table A2 : Unit Root Test of gdp.
23 Table A3 : Unit Root Test of i. 
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Results of the Johansen Cointegration Tests for all 7 VAR specifications. Figure A2 : VAR including House. Impulse Responses to the interest rate shock. Figure A3 : VAR including Flat. Impulse Responses to the interest rate shock. Figure A4 : VAR including Rental. Impulse Responses to the interest rate shock. Figure A5 : VAR including Industry. Impulse Responses to the interest rate shock. Figure A6 : VAR including Office. Impulse Responses to the interest rate shock.
